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As intellectual property claims proliferate in rapidly advancing fields of 
technology, new research paths often cross the boundaries of many prior 
patents. Without an exemption from infringement liability, 1 subsequent inno-
vators need licenses from multiple predecessors to pursue such research pro-
jects. Whether this state of affairs promotes innovation or retards it is an 
empirical question of considerable complexity. 
Suzanne Scotchmer's work on cumulative innovation highlights an impor-
tant policy consideration: patent boundaries are a significant determinant of 
the relative returns to investment at different stages in the course of cumula-
tive innovation. 2 Broad patents on early innovations permit their owners to 
* Robert & Barbara Luciano Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I am 
grateful to John Barton, Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Ronald Mann, and workshop participants 
at New York University Law School, Engelberg Center on Innovation Law and Policy, 
Conference at Villa La Pietra, Florence, Italy (June 1998); the Biotechnology Industry 
Organization annual meeting, New York (June 1998); the American Type Culture Collection 
Patent Seminar, Virginia Center for Innovative Technology (September 1998); the Mayo Clinic 
(October 1998); and the University of California at Berkeley (May 1999) for helpful comments 
on earlier drafts of this chapter. 
1 The US patent statute does not generally exempt research activities from infringement lia-
bility, although it includes a narrow exemption for the use of a patented invention 'solely for uses 
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal Law 
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products': 35 
U.S.C. § 27l(e)(l). 
2 See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the 
Patent Law, 5 J. EcoN. PERSP. 29 (1991); Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division 
of Profit in Sequential Innovation, 26 RAND J. EcoN. 20 (1995). 
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capture, through license transactions, the value that their innovations 
contribute to second generation technologies, ensuring that the incentives of 
early innovators reflect this value. Although the cost of getting licenses from 
prior innovators diminishes the profitability of second generation innova-
tions, 3 Scotchmer argues that subsequent innovators can still recover an ade-
quate return if they negotiate the terms of licenses before they incur research 
and development (R&D) costs. 
This analysis highlights the importance of transactions between prior and 
subsequent innovators to permit valuable research to go forward across the 
boundaries of prior patent claims. In a recent article focusing on biomedical 
research,4 Michael Heller and I argue that too many patent rights on 'upstream' 
discoveries can stifle 'downstream' research and product development by 
increasing transaction costs and magnifying the risk of bargaining failures. Just 
as too few property rights leave communally held resources prone to overuse in 
a 'tragedy of the commons', too many property rights can leave resources prone 
to underuse in what Heller calls a 'tragedy of the anticommons'.5 The greater 
the number of people who need to be brought to agreement in order to permit a 
research project to proceed, the greater the risk that bargaining will break down 
or that transaction costs will consume the gains from exchange. 
Other commentators have noted that such bargaining failures are not 
inevitable. In a world of costless transactions, people could avoid commons 
or anticommons tragedies by trading their rights. Robert Merges has docu-
mented the development of numerous institutions that reduce the transaction 
costs of negotiating through a thicket of intellectual property rights in differ-
ent industries, including the ASCAP copyright collective and the recent 
MPEG patent pool.6 If owners and users manage to negotiate mutually 
agreeable license terms, then a proliferation of patents can promote equitable 
distribution of the value of cumulative and interdependent innovations with-
out unduly inhibiting future research. 
Is bargaining failure in the market for intellectual property licenses a hypo-
thetical problem that sophisticated institutions and well-functioning markets 
3 Scotchmer worries more about preserving the incentives of early innovators on the assump-
tion that the stand-alone value of their innovations will be small relative to that of the later 
innovations that they facilitate. On the other hand, it may be that patent incentives are more 
important in the later stages of cumulative innovation than in the early stages (eg, if early 
innovations are relatively cheap or are subsidized by the government), whereas subsequent inno-
vations are relatively expensive or more dependent on private sector investment-and if so, it 
may make more sense to limit the rights of early innovators so that subsequent innovators can 
capture a larger share of the value of cumulative efforts. 
4 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698 (1998). 
5 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). 
6 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996). See also Merges, Chapter 6 above. 
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are likely to avoid, or is it something to worry about? In biomedical research, 
there is evidence that the problem is real. In 1997-98, I served as chair of the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) Working Group on Research Tools (the 
Working Group), a group charged with investigating difficulties encountered 
by researchers in obtaining access to proprietary research tools-materials, 
information and methods-for use in biomedical research. 7 The Working 
Group gathered information from scientists, university technology transfer 
professionals, and private firms in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
industries.8 Within these communities, there seems to be a widely-shared per-
ception that negotiations over the transfer of proprietary research tools pre-
sent a considerable and growing obstacle to progress in biomedical research 
and product development. Scientists report having to wait months or even 
years to carry out experiments while their institutions attempt to renegotiate 
the terms of 'Material Transfer Agreements' (MT As), database access agree-
ments, and patent license agreements. University technology transfer profes-
sionals report that agreements presented for the transfer of research tools 
impose increasingly onerous terms. They say that the burden of reviewing and 
renegotiating each of a rapidly growing number of agreements for what used 
to be routine exchanges among scientists is overwhelming their limited 
resources. Private firms-both large, established pharmaceutical firms and 
small, young biotechnology companies-also report growing frustration with 
the administrative burden of renegotiating the terms of agreements for the 
transfer of research tools and with attendant delays in research. Some even 
7 See Report of the National Institutes of Health ( NIH) Working Group on Research Tools, 
Presented to the Advisory Committee to the Director (June 4, 1998) <http://www.nih.gov./newsl 
research tools/ index.htm>. 
8 Many of the individuals who spoke with members of the Working Group were concerned 
about maintaining confidentiality. As a result, both the discussion in this chapter and the Report 
of the Working Group avoid the use of specific examples and citations to conversations with spe-
cific individuals. The discussion in text is drawn from communications with representatives of 
many academic institutions and private firms. I also include quotations from some of these con-
versations as recorded in my own notes, although without attribution to specific individuals or 
institutions. The private firms that provided information to the Working Group include: 
Affymetrix; Amgen; Arena Pharmaceuticals; Ares-Serono; Bristol-Myers Squibb; CEPH; 
Cephalon; DuPont; Ergoscience; Genentech; Genetics Institute; Guilford Pharmaceuticals; 
Hoechst Marion Roussel; Hoffmann-La Roche; Human Genome Sciences; Ligand 
Pharmaceuticals; Megabios; Merck; Millennium; Parke-Davis; Pfizer; Pharmacopeia; Schering-
Plough; SmithKline Beecham; Vical. The academic institutions that provided information to the 
Working Group include: Allegheny Health, Education and Research Foundation; The Bowman 
Gray School of Medicine, Wake Forest University; University of California; California Institute 
of Technology; University of Chicago; University of Cincinnati; Columbia University; 
University of Connecticut; Harvard University; University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; 
Indiana University; University of Iowa; Johns Hopkins University; University of Louisville; 
Massachusetts General Hospital; Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Miami University; 
University of Michigan; University of Pennsylvania; Princeton University; University of 
Rochester; Rutgers University; University of South Carolina; Stanford University; State 
University of New York; Tulane University Medical Center; University of Washington; 
Washington University; University of Wisconsin-Madison; Yale University. 
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confided that in internal discussions they have questioned whether it is worth 
their while to continue to exchange research tools with university scientists. 
Although there are many points on which they disagree, most people from 
each of these quarters seem to agree that the problem is growing rather than 
diminishing. 
Why, in this setting, is it proving so difficult to arrive at mutually agreeable 
bargains between prior and subsequent innovators? If transaction costs are 
consuming the gains from exchange, why haven't the communities that con-
front this problem figured out mechanisms for reducing these costs?9 Answers 
to these questions about transactions for the transfer of biomedical research 
tools may shed some light on broader questions about how far we can rely on 
bargains among sequential innovators to allocate new technologies to socially 
valuable uses. If prior and subsequent innovators find it difficult to negotiate 
the terms of transactions for the transfer of intellectual property, then per-
haps initial allocations of intellectual property rights matter, not only because 
they determine the distribution of returns across various stages of cumulative 
innovation, but because they either promote or retard the efficient dissemi-
nation of prior discoveries to subsequent innovators. 
I. Background 
Current problems in the exchange of biomedical research tools arise in the 
context of dramatic institutional and cultural changes in biomedical research 
that have not yet come to rest. One important policy shift has come from pas-
sage of the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act10 and subsequent Congressional directives 
that encourage universities and other recipients of federal research funds to 
patent the results of federally-sponsored research. 11 The result has been a dra-
matic increase in patent filings from institutions that, in an earlier era, were 
more likely to make their discoveries freely available. 12 Two dimensions of 
this change are particularly relevant to current problems surrounding the 
exchange of research tools. First, it has expanded and diversified the types of 
institutions claiming proprietary rights in their discoveries, as academic and 
nonprofit institutions have established technology transfer offices to patent 
9 The Association of University Technology Managers has attempted to streamline transac-
tions for the transfer of biomedical research tools by creating a Uniform Biological Materials 
Transfer Agreement (UBMTA). See 60 Fed. Reg. 12771 (1995). Many universities have 
approved the use of the UBMTA in principle, but few seem actually to use it. More recently, in 
response to the Report of the Working Group, NIH has created guidelines on research tools that 
include a proposed form agreement. See 64 Fed. Reg. 72090 (1999). 
10 35 u.s.c. §§ 200-211. 
11 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and 
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996). 
12 See Rebecca Henderson et al., Universities as a Source of Commercial Technology: A 
Detailed Analysis of University Patenting 1965-1988, 80 REV. EcoN. & STAT. 119 (1998). 
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faculty inventions and to market them to commercial firms. Secondly is a 
corresponding expansion and diversification in the types of discoveries that 
are the subject of proprietary claims to include the early-stage discoveries, 
considerably removed from product development, that typically emerge from 
government-sponsored biomedical research. The domain of proprietary 
exchange has thus become more diverse in terms of both the participants and 
the objects of exchange. 
A related, contemporaneous change has been the emergence of commercial 
biotechnology firms in market niches that lie somewhere between fundamen-
tal academic research and end product development. These biotechnology 
firms differ from established pharmaceutical firms in important ways. Many 
of these firms have academic scientists as founders, retain strong scientific and 
financial ties to academic institutions, and rely on government grants for 
research funding. Lacking end products for sale to non-research consumers, 
some of these firms survive in the private sector by selling research tools and 
the research capabilities of their scientific personnel to other institutions, 
especially to major pharmaceutical firms. The evolving profit strategies of 
biotechnology firms often depend heavily on intellectual property rights in 
discoveries that are primarily inputs into further research. These firms are 
motivated to exchange research tools with other institutions, but they also 
need to preserve the competitive and financial value of their research tools. 
The shifting balance of public and private funding for biomedical research 
is another factor with an important bearing on exchanges of research tools. 13 
In the past decade, despite steady increases in federal funding for health-
related research, 14 private funding overtook public funding as the principal 
source of support for biomedical research in the United States. 15 Although 
public funding remains the principal source of support for university-based 
biomedical research, public-private boundaries are blurring as relationships 
between academic institutions and private firms proliferate in the life sci-
ences.16 Collaborative research that pools research capabilities and funds 
from different institutions in the public and private sectors is increasingly 
13 See National Science Board, Science & Engineering Indicators-1998 (1998) (hereinafter 
1998 Indicators) <http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind98/start.htm>. 
14 See ibid ch. 4, at 3. 
15 See National Institutes of Health: Source of Funds, Medical and Health Related R&D: Fiscal 
Years 1986-1995 (visited September I, 1999) <http://www4.od.nih.gov/ofm/PRIMER97/page6. 
stm>. According to these data, from 1986---1995, government funding for medical and health-
related R&D doubled, from $7,924 million to $15,846 million, while industry funding for med-
ical and health-related R&D more than tripled, from $6,192 million to $18,645 million. These 
data indicate that industry funding first exceeded government funding in 1992. 
16 See David Blumenthal et al., Relationships Between Academic Institutions and Industry in the 
Life Sciences-An Industry Survey, 334 N. ENG. J. MED. 368 (1996) (finding that 90 percent of 
companies conducting life science research in the United States had relationships involving the 
life sciences with academic institutions). 
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common, not only in the life sciences17 but across all fields of research. 18 
Mature pharmaceutical firms, biotechnology start-ups, and academic institu-
tions find themselves sometimes collaborating and sometimes competing to 
achieve overlapping research goals. As a result, it is often difficult to tell when 
an academic researcher is a commercial competitor. 
In this environment, many institutions that develop new materials, 
methods, and information for use in research regard these tools as valuable 
intellectual property. By restricting access to new research tools, some insti-
tutions seek to capture their value through sales and licenses to researchers in 
other institutions, and some seek to preserve a competitive advantage in sub-
sequent stages of research by withholding these resources from their rivals 
entirely. At the same time, many scientists and institutions at least purport 
to embrace traditional scientific norms calling for widespread sharing of 
research tools to promote scientific progress, especially when they seek access 
to tools that have been created by others. 
Some of these scientists and institutions resolve the dissonance between the 
norms they would apply to the tools created by others and the norms they 
abide by in disseminating their own tools through the use of carefully crafted 
definitions of the term 'research tool'. The term 'research tool' would seem to 
connote a user perspective, indicating something that is not yet an end prod-
uct and has its primary value as an input into further research. Yet a user's 
research tool may be a provider's end product. Some products that are cur-
rently used in research might also have markets, actual or potential, among 
nonresearch consumers. A pharmaceutical compound might be used in acad-
emic research, and a DNA sequence that is associated with disease might be 
marketed as a diagnostic product at the same time that it is used in further 
research to understand its role in a disease pathway. Some biotechnology 
firms make a business out of developing and supplying proprietary materials, 
information and methods that are useful primarily, if not only, in further 
research; to these firms research tools are end products. 
Some major pharmaceutical firms that earn profits by selling proprietary 
drugs to nonresearch consumers have been outspoken supporters of improv-
ing access to research tools throughout the research community. 19 But what 
these firms mean by 'research tools' is the biological materials that they use in 
17 See Walter W. Powell et al., Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation: 
Networks of Learning in Biotechnology, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 116 (1996). See also Powell, Chapter 
10 below. 
18 See 1998 Indicators, n. 13 above, at 4-28 to 4-32. 
19 A research director of a major pharmaceutical firm said that 'we consider this a matter of 
enlightened self-interest-no one can own them all, so we really should figure out ways to make 
them accessible'. He conceded that his firm will not supply materials to a competitor, noting that 
it is important to 'distinguish enlightened self-interest from stupidity', but said that if a competi-
tor were willing to make the materials itself and simply needed a license to avoid patent infringe-
ment, the firm would provide an 'unblocking license' for a nominal fee. 
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the course of drug discovery, not the end products that they sell (or hope to 
sell) to consumers.20 The same firms are quite restrictive about disseminating 
their own proprietary therapeutic products to researchers. A scientific liaison 
for a biotechnology firm that makes transgenic animals, noting that there are 
different levels of security for different types of materials, states that 'any type 
of proprietary material is not a research tool' and 'our transgenics are pro-
prietary'. A representative of a biotechnology firm that sells therapeutic pro-
teins has two different form agreements-a simple form with few restrictions 
that it uses for 'things that aren't proprietary products in development', and 
a more restrictive form that it uses for materials that the firm has identified as 
potential products. 
Institutions tend to be high-minded about the importance of unfettered 
access to the research tools that they want to acquire from others, but no insti-
tution is willing to share freely the materials and discoveries from which they 
derive significant competitive advantage. Thus many of the people that spoke 
with the Working Group were eager to establish that the term 'research tool' 
means something other than their own institution's crown jewels. Those firms 
whose crown jewels could only be characterized as 'research tools' insisted 
that they were different in kind from ordinary research tools and therefore 
called for different terms of exchange.21 When one institution's research tool 
is another firm's end product, it is difficult to agree upon a universe of mate-
rials that should be exchanged on standardized terms. 
Some proprietary research tools have been widely distributed under license 
agreements that permit subsequent research to go forward while preserving a 
return for the patent owner. Two outstanding examples of fundamental 
importance to biomedical research are the recently-expired Cohen-Boyer 
patents on recombinant DNA technologies, jointly owned by Stanford 
University and the University of California, 22 and the patents on the poly-
merase chain reaction (PCR) owned by Hoffmann-La Roche.23 Both are 
20 A representative of a major pharmaceutical firm defined 'research tool' as 'something that 
gets you on the path of doing drug discovery, not a chemical entity or product, but an assay, or 
a target, or genetic information encoding a target, cell line, or other materials used in the research 
process'. A senior executive from another major pharmaceutical firm acknowledged that such a 
broad definition of 'research tool' would extend to materials that 'may be a quite meaningful 
competitive differentiation, particularly to a small company that makes a living through the iden-
tification of[drug) targets'. He added that even for large companies, 'if you have a series of mol-
ecular species that have given you the ability to resolve a disease pathway ahead of your 
competitors, that has competitive value, and you don't want others to use the tools after you've 
invested time and money to get there'. 
21 A lawyer for a biotechnology firm that earns most of its revenue from selling tools used in 
the analysis of gene expression stated that 'while on the surface it might look like what we have 
is a simple research tool, the value [of the product) is orders of magnitude more than what any 
other research tool might have'. 
22 See Intellectual Property Rights and the Dissemination of Research Tools in Molecular 
Biology: Summary of a Workshop Held at the National Academy of Sciences, February 15-16, 
1996, 40-42 (l 997). 
23 See ibid, 43-46. 
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fundamental enabling technologies that have had considerable value in 
research on a wide range of problems, and both have been licensed on terms 
that have permitted widespread dissemination and use. 
One might expect these early success stories to lead the way toward the 
licensing of other research tools on increasingly routine and uncontroversial 
terms. Yet recent experience reveals precisely the opposite trend. Exchanges 
between universities and private firms are particularly likely to be problem-
atic, but bargaining difficulties extend to purely academic and purely com-
mercial exchanges as well. Although there is significant variation in the terms 
of agreements for the transfer of research tools, most of the conflict between 
providers and users of research tools focuses on the same handful of provi-
sions over and over again. 24 
Some, but not all, of these conflicts have been relatively easy to resolve 
through negotiations. For example, tool providers will often modify restric-
tive prepublication review provisions in response to objections from the 
user.25 What is surprising about these routinely renegotiated provisions is 
that tool providers continue to propose the more aggressive terms initially, 
rather than modifying the language of their draft agreements to avoid the 
costs of repeated renegotiations. 26 
More intractable disagreements arise over so-called 'reach-through' and 
'grantback' provisions governing rights to potential future inventions made 
by the user of the research tool. For example, providers ofresearch tools may 
seek royalties on future product sales, options to acquire exclusive or nonex-
clusive licenses under future patents, or even outright ownership of future 
inventions as a condition for making the tools available. Through such pro-
visions, owners of research tools may seek to leverage their proprietary rights 
in early innovations into a share of the profits from future innovations that 
may be more lucrative. Or, by asking for automatic license rights to discov-
eries made while using their tools, they may seek to protect themselves from 
intellectual property claims that users might assert against them in the future. 
But these precommitments to extend future licenses create a problem for users 
of multiple research tools faced with similar reach-through demands from 
multiple owners. A user cannot promise an exclusive license to future discov-
eries more than once in the course of a research project before creating 
24 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Streamlining the Transfer of Research Tools, 74 ACADEMIC 
MEDICINE 683 (1999). 
25 For example, the provider's initial draft might require the user to submit manuscripts for 
pre-publication review 180 days prior to submission for publication, a period that is reduced to 
60 days in the course of negotiations. 
26 One inhouse lawyer for a biotechnology firm suggested that a possible explanation for 
repeated use of forms that consistently need to be renegotiated may be that these forms are 
drafted by retained counsel that profit from the time spent in renegotiating the terms of the agree-
ment. Another possibility is that sometimes the forms are signed in the form presented, encour-
aging owners to try for the same terms again. 
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conflicting obligations. Even past promises of nonexclusive licenses would 
conflict with future promises of exclusive licenses to the same discoveries. 
Concerned about incurring overlapping and inconsistent obligations to 
providers of different research tools, and reluctant to enter into agreements 
that disable them from licensing potential future discoveries as they see fit 
before they even know what the discoveries are, users balk at signing the prof-
fered terms of access, and negotiations stall. 
Although the terms of access to some high value research tools have pro-
voked controversy,27 the more serious bottleneck to research is the growing 
burden of negotiating numerous agreements for routine use of methods, 
materials and data in experiments. Taken individually, none of these agree-
ments is likely to yield commercially valuable results. Nonetheless, in the 
aggregate, they create significant administrative delays that slow the pace of 
research. 
II. Analysis 
The investigation of the Working Group on Research Tools provides a rare 
opportunity to examine, from multiple perspectives, difficulties encountered 
in negotiating for the transfer of intellectual property. What accounts for 
apparently growing difficulties in establishing a market for the exchange of 
biomedical research tools? Four themes emerge from interviews with partici-
pants in this market, each of which I elaborate below. First, transaction costs 
are a greater obstacle to low-value exchanges than to high-value exchanges. 
Transaction costs are thus more likely to impede the transfer ofresearch tools 
for use in experiments that are unlikely to yield commercially valuable results 
than they are to impede major research collaborations, even among the same 
people and institutions. Secondly, heterogeneities among institutions within 
the biomedical research community seem to be complicating the search for 
mutually agreeable terms of exchange. Universities, pharmaceutical firms, 
and biotechnology firms each find it relatively easy to deal with their own 
kind, but each finds institutions of the other kinds to be unreasonable and 
unrealistic in their demands and expectations. Thirdly, even within a single 
institution, the interests of scientists who make and use research tools and the 
interests of the lawyers and business people who negotiate the terms of these 
exchanges on behalf of the institutions that employ the scientists are not nec-
essarily the same, and these different 'agents' do not always present a united 
front in negotiations. These internal conflicts complicate the bargaining 
process and frustrate the emergence of agreement about fair terms of 
27 See, eg, Eliot Marshall, The Mouse That Prompted a Roar, 277 Sc1. 24 (1997); Jon Cohen, 
Exclusive License Rankles Genome Researchers, 276 Sc1. 1489 (1997). 
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exchange within the biomedical research community. Fourthly, evaluation of 
research tools, and estimation of the contribution that they might make to 
potential future discoveries, is highly speculative and subjective and does not 
lend itself to dispassionate negotiations from agreed-upon benchmarks. 
A. Transaction costs 
A striking feature of the market for biomedical research tools is the sophisti-
cation of the institutions involved and the frequency with which the same 
parties conclude other, higher value deals.28 How can it be that institutions 
with the resources and skills to establish major collaborative research agree-
ments nonetheless stumble over mundane exchanges of research materials 
and techniques? 
A simple explanation is that transaction costs are worth incurring for high 
value transactions, but not for low value transactions. Collaborative research 
agreements generally involve more substantial commitments of resources, 
and hopes for future value, on all sides of the deal than MTAs.29 Not 
surprisingly, institutions involved in biomedical research give priority in the 
allocation of their negotiating resources to higher value transactions, while 
lower value transactions get deferred. As a result, the transaction cost bottle-
neck presents more of a problem for low value exchanges than for major col-
laborations. 
This generalization was repeatedly confirmed by people who negotiate 
agreements on behalf of institutions in the private sector. Representatives of 
biotechnology firms and pharmaceutical firms indicated that, although rou-
tine exchanges are increasingly likely to be delayed to the point that the trans-
action loses its value, the exchanges of research tools that matter most to the 
firms' scientists generally go forward. 30 Representatives of universities, on the 
28 Walter Powell describes elaborate networks for pooling the resources of pharmaceutical 
firms, biotechnology firms, and universities to perform collaborative biomedical research. See, 
eg, Walter W. Powell & Jason Owen-Smith, Commercialism in Universities: Life Sciences 
Research and its Linkage with Industry, 17 J. PoL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 253 (1998); Powell et al., 
n. 17 above. 
29 As noted earlier in text, MT A is a standard abbreviation for a 'material transfer agreement' 
that sets forth the terms of access to a (typically unpatented) biological material. Several repre-
sentatives of private companies said that they would only use an MT A if the company has little 
or no interest in the research of the scientist to whom it is sending a research tool. If the company 
anticipates that the scientist's research will yield valuable results, it would propose a more sub-
stantial relationship, perhaps involving research sponsorship or collaboration. Exchanges for 
which an MT A is used are thus typically of low value to the provider of the material. 
3° For example, a Vice President and General Counsel of a biotechnology company stated 
that 'there isn't anything that people can't get access to if they really need it', although sometimes 
it is cheaper and easier to design around a proprietary research tool. A representative of a dif-
ferent biotechnology company reported that her firm only cares about approximately I 00 MT As 
out of 2,000 that she processes annually, and those agreements always get done. The research 
director of a major pharmaceutical firm claims that his firm has never had to shut down a 
research project for failure to gain access to a proprietary research tool, although they sometimes 
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other hand, appear to be frustrated not only by the large volume oflow value 
agreements demanding their attention, but also by the terms of access to cer-
tain high value research tools that have led to bargaining impasses.31 
Even from the perspective of large, private firms, the value of foregone 
exchanges due to failed bargains over the transfer of research tools is often 
more than trivial. For example, a former scientist who now represents a major 
pharmaceutical firm in research tool negotiations indicated that, even when 
her firm would be willing to pay $20,000 for a license to a research tool, nego-
tiations over contract language can take months or years, during which time 
the scientists often give up and turn their attention to something else. 32 The 
same representative indicated that when her firm receives an unsolicited 
request to provide a research tool, the firm is unwilling to invest any resources 
at all in renegotiating the terms of exchange; would-be users can take the 
firm's form agreement or leave it.33 Paradoxically, such cost-driven intransi-
gence in renegotiating the terms of agreements may slow the emergence of a 
consensus on what counts as fair terms of exchange. A representative of 
another pharmaceutical firm explained that 'the deal breaker [in negotiations 
over the transfer of research tools] typically isn't cost, but terms and condi-
tions'. 
The terms and conditions that are so difficult to agree upon generally 
involve the allocation of speculative future value and risks. If most transfers 
of research tools will not produce discoveries of any value, the ratio of value 
to transaction costs could be improved, and aggregate transaction costs 
reduced, by deferring the most difficult negotiations until after it becomes 
apparent that there is significant value at stake. Some firms try to do this-or 
at least suspect that other firms try to do this-by using patented research 
tools without a license, assuming that they can settle the matter later in the 
have spent considerable resources inventing around patents, and sometimes have performed 
experiments offshore when a US license has not been available on reasonable terms. 
31 See, eg, Marshall, n. 27 above; Cohen, n. 27 above. 
32 'We wouldn't mind paying $20,000 for a license ifwe thought it were something we could 
build a research program on ... The biggest barrier in that price range is disagreements over legal 
language and the turnaround time to get that accomplished. Most university offices have long 
backlogs of these projects on their desks, and they have to prioritize. Rarely does it seem like our 
small research tool contracts make it to the top of their piles. It takes a long time for them to get 
back to us ... We also have limited staff that can work on these agreements ... If each round 
takes a couple of months, even though it might take only an hour or so, it ends up taking several 
months. I'm working on something that's taken over a year for a $20,000 research tool. We're 
stuck on the issue of indemnification ... Eventually, the scientists shrug their shoulders and pick 
something else to work on rather than trying to work out an agreement with the university ... 
It's the time delay, rather than the cost, that discourages us from going forward most of the time.' 
33 'We have a policy that people find pretty hard. Ifwe get an unsolicited MTA, we basically 
ask them to accept our MTA word for word. But if our scientist says that this is a valuable pro-
posal and the data would be important for us, then we'll try to work it out. It's a two-tiered sys-
tem. We are constrained in terms of the legal staff that we have available. Otherwise, we couldn't 
get any work done.' 
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unlikely event that they discover something significant. 34 Other firms try to 
achieve a similar result through the use of agreements that do not resolve dif-
ficult issues, such as the division of future intellectual property, up front. 
Instead, they preserve the parties' bargaining positions and obligate each side 
to return to the table for further negotiations in the event that a valuable dis-
covery emerges. Although this is not always possible, a lawyer for a biotech-
nology company reported some success with such a strategy in negotiations 
over transfers of his company's libraries of combinatorial chemistry com-
pounds to other firms planning to screen the compounds against their own 
proprietary biological targets. Frustrated with up-front negotiations that 
could take a year or longer, he began proposing simple agreements under 
which his firm would make its compounds available to firms that would 
promise to return to negotiate over any 'hits' between compounds and targets 
prior to filing any patent applications. He proposed such contracts to 15 firms 
over the course of a year and concluded seven deals on those terms. The sub-
sequent license negotiations over rights to the 'hits' take time, 'but at least 
you're arguing over something that has value'. 
Not all transfers of research tools can follow a strategy of deferring nego-
tiation over the tough issues until it is known whether the results justify the 
transaction costs. The reason this strategy is viable for the screening transac-
tions is that each side is in a position to withhold value after the screening is 
complete, and thus each side retains bargaining leverage for use in subsequent 
negotiations. The owner of the combinatorial chemistry libraries has intellec-
tual property rights in the compounds that can still be enforced after the 
screening is complete, and the owner of the targets can disclose the existence 
of a hit '3/hile withholding information about which compound has hit which 
target. Each side thus has good reason to return to the bargaining table after 
a successful screening. Often, however, the owner of a research tool retains no 
leverage after the fact if use of the tool facilitates a valuable discovery. Tool 
owners are thus forced to negotiate before the research takes place if they 
wish to stake a claim to future value, even though at that point the value is 
entirely speculative. 
When progress in research depends on the relatively unfettered flow oflow 
value exchanges of information and materials among scientists, a prolifera-
tion of intellectual property claims to the objects of these exchanges may 
impose transaction costs that consume the gains from exchange. If owners 
and users are unable to reduce these transaction costs, exchanges that could 
have considerable value in the aggregate might not occur. 
34 One representative of a major pharmaceutical firm, while insisting that his own firm has a 
strict policy of not infringing patents, said that 'other companies just go ahead and work on the 
project without a license. The likelihood of success is so low, you end up buying 100,000 licenses 
for everything that succeeds. You spend a lot of money churning. People on the outside don't 
know if companies are using things on the inside. Maybe they think they can litigate it after, or 
get licenses retrospectively'. 
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B. Institutional heterogeneity 
Biomedical research occurs in universities, nonprofit institutions, govern-
ment agencies, small biotechnology firms and major pharmaceutical firms. 
Research in each of these settings both draws on and contributes to research 
in the other settings, yet these institutions have different missions and objec-
tives and face different constraints. Elinor Ostrom and others have observed 
that heterogeneous groups have greater difficulties than homogeneous groups 
in reaching agreement on how to manage natural resources so as to avoid a 
tragedy of the commons.35 The investigation of the Working Group on 
Research Tools suggests a parallel phenomenon in efforts of the heteroge-
neous biomedical research community to manage intellectual property rights 
so as to avoid a tragedy of the anticommons.36 
Across the spectrum of institutions involved in biomedical research, people 
report that although they sometimes have difficulty reaching agreements 
within their own sector, the really serious problems arise in dealing with the 
other sectors. More specifically, with a few exceptions, the primary focus of 
complaints is difficulty negotiating the terms of access to incoming research 
tools from institutions in other sectors rather than difficulty negotiating the 
terms of access to outgoing research tools. Whether the research tool origi-
nates in a university, a biotechnology firm, or a pharmaceutical firm, it is 
generally the would-be user who is frustrated by the provider's terms of 
exchange. 
Representatives of universities say that they are generally successful in 
negotiating with other universities, but that they find private firms unreason-
able and unrealistic in their expectations of what academic institutions can 
promise in exchange for access to research tools. In the private sector, one 
hears exactly the opposite generalization-that private firms know how to do 
deals, but that universities are unreasonable and unrealistic in their demands. 
Even within the private sector, representatives of pharmaceutical firms find it 
relatively easy to deal with other pharmaceutical firms, but find many 
biotechnology firms to be unreasonable and unrealistic in their demands. 
Although all sides recognize that differences in institutional resources and 
missions might justify asymmetrical terms of exchange, each side seems to 
think that the asymmetries should work in its favor. For example, universities 
often expect private firms to make research tools freely available to university 
scientists, although the same universities routinely charge private firms for 
access to research tools created in academic laboratories. 37 Universities feel 
35 See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
36 See Heller & Eisenberg, n. 4 above. 
37 In the words of the general counsel for a biotechnology firm, 'When [they seek access to a 
research tool from a company], universities wear the mortarboard, they want the company to pay 
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justified in making this distinction because their own research is for academic 
purposes, whereas the research done in private firms is for profit. 38 In the 
ethos of many university technology transfer professionals, the financial 
interests of their institutions converge with the public interest in scientific 
progress. 39 But private firms resent this claim to the moral high ground and 
see it as hypocritical. Some representatives of private firms challenge the 
claim that university research is not for profit, noting that many university 
scientists collaborate with private firms, and that proprietary research tools 
supplied to university scientists sometimes find their way into the hands of 
commercial competitors.40 Others take exception to the claim that it is more 
fair for universities to restrict access to their research tools by commercial sci-
entists than it is for commercial firms to restrict access to their research tools 
by academic scientists. Instead, they argue that university research is publicly-
subsidized and should therefore benefit the taxpaying public, including pri-
vate firms, while companies that pay for research with shareholder dollars 
have a corresponding obligation to return value to their shareholders and 
therefore cannot give intellectual property away.41 
The Working Group also heard numerous complaints from representatives 
of all sectors of the biomedical research community that their counterparts in 
the other sectors are unrealistic in their demands and fail to appreciate the dif-
ficulties that they face in complying with contract terms. For example, recur-
ring complaints among university technology transfer professionals focus on 
prepublication review provisions and limitations on who can work with the 
all the money and take all the risk. But when they [seek to license a research tool out to a com-
pany], they scream about how they don't have any money, they're constantly ripped off by pri-
vate firms ... Universities want it both ways. They want to be commercial institutes when it 
comes to licensing their technology, but to be academic environments when it comes to accessing 
technology that others have developed. Sit down with a university and they will insist that they 
have discovered the holy grail and it's worth all the tea in China. But if they need something, they 
are academic institutions who are being impeded. They throw the same things in the way of small 
companies'. 
38 This attitude was particularly apparent in discussions among university technology trans-
fer professionals at a meeting of the Association of University Technology Managers attended 
by members of the Working Group. 
39 A representative of a nonprofit institution told me that when, in the course of negotiations 
over terms of access to a research tool, a private firm tells her that they have a duty to their share-
holders, she responds that she has a duty to the public. 
40 The research director of a major pharmaceutical firm claimed that academic scientists 
whose names would be recognizable to the firm as collaborators of its competitors sometimes 
use graduate students and post-doctoral fellows to get access to materials without revealing 
their identities. The general counsel of a biotechnology firm similarly reported that 'many com-
panies will tell you they've been burned by professors who've made deals with multiple com-
panies'. 
41 The words of a representative of a major pharmaceutical firm are typical of many comments 
from the private sector: 'It's hard to expect companies to forbear from seeking the same terms 
that universities are seeking. The universities don't have any moral imperative working in their 
favor-they aren't even accountable to shareholders'. 
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materials and what they can do with them. 42 They cite these provisions as evi-
dence of a lack of appreciation for the open culture of academic research and 
the absence of control mechanisms within universities for ensuring compli-
ance.43 
University representatives also complain about prohibitions on the use of 
materials in research that is subject to a licensing obligation to another entity, 
and grantback provisions that give the provider automatic licenses under 
future patents. Such provisions, in their view, create conflicting obligations 
when multiple firms provide different research tools for use in the same pro-
ject. They worry that contractual obligations to extend even nonexclusive 
licenses to past providers of research tools will compromise universities' 
stewardship over future discoveries. They point out that when these discov-
eries result from government-sponsored research, the Bayh-Dole Act imposes 
technology transfer obligations on the university.44 In this view, the owner-
ship rights that universities retain over discoveries made with public funds 
come with a corresponding trust that obligates universities to license those 
discoveries so as to promote transfer of technology to the private sector. 
Often, the best way to promote commercial development of an invention is to 
grant an exclusive license to a firm that promises to pursue development with 
diligence. But universities are unable to grant such exclusive licenses if they 
have previously promised nonexclusive licenses to past providers of research 
tools under the terms of MT As. Precommitted licenses to future discoveries 
also conflict with opportunities to obtain corporate research funding for uni-
versity-based research, as corporate research sponsors typically demand pref-
erential license rights to such discoveries. Universities see the exchange of 
future license rights for access to a research tool as tantamount to 'free 
research for the company' that provides the tool. This characterization 
42 A representative of a university that many companies singled out for praise as a negotiat-
ing partner observed that Amost of these problems appear to be caused by the material 
provider's inexperience in dealing with a non-profit institution and its special duties and con-
cerns'. 
43 One university technology transfer professional explained that 'scientists have a tendency 
to get material for one purpose and use it for something else. Nobody knows about it. It's up to 
the investigator to comply with reporting requirements [to the provider of a research tool]. We 
don't have the resources to do it ... Research projects metamorphose all the time'. In fact, many 
companies are acutely aware of the risk that scientists will obtain material for one purpose and, 
without letting the company know what they are doing, use it for another in violation of their 
agreements. They seek to control this risk through the terms of their MT As. 
44 As explained by a representative of a major research university, 'Because companies will 
not typically allow use of their materials in research being funded by another commercial entity, 
the material provider who successfully negotiates sole rights gets exclusive control of inventions 
whose discovery was funded by the federal government-simply by providing a sample of mate-
rial ... The provider who successfully negotiates an automatic, royalty-free, non-exclusive 
license has seriously damaged the ability of the research institution to promote the commercial 
development and marketing of any invention by offering exclusivity as an incentive to invest-
ment'. 
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enrages firms that see themselves as seeking a modest quid pro quo for pro-
viding free materials to university scientists. 45 
Companies complain that universities do not understand business and suf-
fer from a 'cultural schizophrenia' about whether they are businesses or aca-
demic institutions. In the words of a lawyer for a company that was the focus 
of many complaints from university technology transfer professionals: '(uni-
versity] tech transfer offices are not close enough to people who do deals. 
People out here do deals, and do them fast. University tech transfer offices 
take eight months to get to the point of doing a deal, and then the relevant 
people quit and you have to start over with someone else ... They're overly 
conservative. They would rather pass up ten good deals than make one mis-
take' .46 A number of private firms complained that university technology 
transfer offices are inadequately staffed, use inexperienced people who Jack 
adequate authority to conclude agreements, and place considerable pressure 
on their staffs to bring in money for the university, giving them little incentive 
to spend time on smaller agreements for the transfer of research tools.47 
45 The 'free research' characterization infuriates corporate providers of research tools to univer-
sities because it suggests that the value of the research tool is zero. From another perspective, how-
ever, it may not be entirely off the mark. When asked why they provide research tools to university 
researchers, many representatives of private firms cited the benefit of getting interesting and reliable 
research results from leading experts in the field. For example, a lawyer for a small biotechnology 
firm explained that 'small companies can't do everything. Often what you're looking for is an expert 
in academia who isn't in a competing company, has lots of expertise in the area, and may be the best 
person in the country to work on it, giving us confidence in the results'. A senior patent counsel for 
a larger biotechnology firm said 'it's useful to learn as much as possible about our proteins. We'd 
probably miss things if we did everything internally, because we don't have expertise in all tissue 
types and organs. In fact, we've learned a lot from academics. We've had a number of developments 
come back to us, and we've licensed in a new use of a material'. In other words, companies make 
research tools available to university researchers because that is a cheap way of getting research 
done that might yield useful results for the firm. Similar motivations account for the interest of firms 
in receiving incoming research tools that have been developed by university scientists, notwith-
standing the difficulties that they describe in negotiating with university technology transfer offices. 
A representative of a small biotechnology company explains: 'It's just time that we're saving by get-
ting [a tool] from a university. If I were Merck or Pfizer, they may have their own cloning group. 
They know up-front that it's not worth wasting time dealing with universities. They're so resource-
rich, but we're not. We have to go to the academic community'. These comments from the private 
sector suggest that an important motivation for exchanging materials with academic investigators, 
whether the firm is providing or receiving the materials, is to obtain research results while conserv-
ing the firm's own resources for other research projects. 
46 The same lawyer also expressed contempt for the competence of universities in licensing out 
their own technology to companies: 'We don't have any faith in the ability of universities to license 
technology effectively. They don't have the infrastructure, they don't understand, they don't have a 
clear mission. The scientific collaborators want it both ways-they want to pocket their money but 
remain in the ivory tower. Quite frankly I have no faith in them to license it and get value out ofit, 
to appreciate what's valuable in it ... We want to be in a position to control what's done'. 
47 The research director for a major pharmaceutical firm explained: 'Problems we have that 
are impediments to getting things done quickly are tech transfer offices not having enough people 
available, combined with the agenda to bring in money for university, means that it's hard to get 
their attention to these smaller agreements. You need to get the attention of enlightened people 
on both sides in order to do these low-cost agreements in a more rapid, expedient way. You need 
enough people with the tools of legal language at their fingertips'. 
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Another recurring complaint was that universities try to impose unrealistic 
diligence obligations on firms to achieve rapid commercial development and 
are unduly suspicious that firms will suppress licensed technology.48 
Perhaps the most consistent complaint about universities from the private 
sector is that they overvalue their own discoveries49 and underestimate the 
considerable risk and expense involved in commercial research and product 
development. 50 Pharmaceutical firms voice a similar complaint about 
biotechnology companies, 51 and biotechnology companies say the same 
about people who provide them with research tools. 52 
Heterogeneities within the biomedical research community appear to 
impede the exchange of research tools in a number of ways. Each segment of 
the community feels misunderstood by the others, and each feels that the dif-
ferences in institutional cultures and missions should weigh in its favor. 
Institutions from each of the different segments of the community thus have 
an easier time negotiating mutually agreeable terms of exchange with their 
own kind than with representatives of the other segments. 
C. Conflicting agendas of different agents 
Quite apart from heterogeneities across the spectrum of institutions involved 
in biomedical research, each institution itself is a heterogeneous community 
employing different kinds of people whose agendas may come into conflict in 
negotiating the terms of transfer for research tools. This was particularly 
apparent for universities, perhaps because the Working Group separately 
sought out the views of scientists and technology transfer professionals 
within universities. The perceptions and concerns of these two groups differ 
48 A vice president and general counsel for a biotechnology company complained that uni-
versities 'want to revoke the license if they don't see an NDA [New Drug Application] filed [with 
the Food and Drug Administration] within three years. They have no idea how long it takes to 
go from an IND [Investigational New Drug application] to an NDA. Academic institutions are 
always afraid someone is going to tie up their technology. Why would I want to do that?' 
49 One lawyer for a biotechnology company politely observed that 'the academic community 
sometimes has less information than the company does about what kind of royalties are typical'. 
A less diplomatic representative of a major pharmaceutical firm said that 'university tech trans-
fer offices have gone fantastical'. 
50 A licensing professional in a major pharmaceutical firm, citing the tendency of universities 
to overvalue molecular drug targets that might be used to screen potential products, explained: 
'Universities don't understand the drug discovery process. They think screens are like sieves, with 
drugs coming out the bottom. They don't understand how much attrition there is in the path of 
product development'. 
51 One representative of a pharmaceutical firm said that many biotechnology companies that 
seek substantial reach-through royalties on future products are 'dreaming', and that 'greedy 
biotechs will freeze themselves out'. 
52 For example, a senior executive of a genomics company reported that clinicians who collect 
DNA samples from families for use in cloning disease genes often seek royalties on future prod-
ucts, without appreciating how much more work remains to be done to clone the genes involved 
in the disease pathways and identify potential drug targets. 
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strikingly, setting the stage for intra-institutional conflict and raising obsta-
cles to the emergence of market norms. 
Academic scientists are under considerable pressure to generate and pub-
lish research results. Their top priority when they seek access to research tools 
is acquiring the materials they need as quickly as possible. Scientists have lim-
ited patience for reading the terms of the agreements accompanying these 
tools and express considerable irritation with their institutional representa-
tives for taking too long to get the paperwork in order. Rather than seeing 
these technology transfer professionals as facilitators and guardians of their 
best interests who enable them to gain access to research tools on reasonable 
terms, they see them, in the words of one scientist, as 'paper pushers who sit 
on these documents and try to find errors' .53 
University technology transfer professionals, on the other hand, are pri-
marily charged with licensing university-owned inventions out to the private 
sector and bringing in money to the university (whether in the form of grants 
or license revenues). 54 Their top priorities in reviewing agreements are to pro-
tect the university and its scientists from incurring obligations that will limit 
their freedom to conduct research, to preserve future opportunities to obtain 
research funding, and to preserve their freedom to license future discoveries 
on lucrative terms. From their perspective, the terms of incoming MT As are 
treacherous land-mines waiting to explode beneath unsuspecting signatories. 
They see scientists within their institutions as naive, short-sighted, and care-
less in their readiness to assume legal obligations that they will later regret. 55 
53 This is more of a problem for some kinds of contract provisions than for others. Technology 
transfer professionals in universities report that it is relatively easy to explain to scientists why 
they should resist draconian prepublication review provisions, but that the scientists see little 
point to renegotiating provisions governing more remote contingencies such as the allocation of 
intellectual property rights in future discoveries or the allocation of tort liability in the event of 
injuries. Particular difficulties arise with definitions of terms used in agreements that do not track 
the ordinary meaning of these terms to scientists. For example, an agreement might define 'the 
material' that is subject to restrictions in a way that includes modified derivatives, or it might 
define prohibited use for 'commercial purposes' to include use in research that is subject to a 
licensing obligation to another firm (including a firm that might have supplied another research 
tool). On a quick reading, these provisions appear innocuous to scientists, leading them to sus-
pect that it is their own university technology transfer office, rather than the provider of the mate-
rial, that is being unreasonable. 
54 In some universities, agreements governing incoming research tools are processed by an 
office that is primarily concerned with negotiating and administering grants for sponsored 
research, while in other universities they are processed by a technology transfer office that is pri-
marily concerned with negotiating and administering license agreements for university-owned 
technologies. Either way, incoming research tool agreements represent an additional responsi-
bility that adds to the workload of the professional staff without adding in any visible way to the 
revenues that they bring in to the university. 
55 Speaking about the university's reluctance to agree to assume tort liability under an MTA, 
one university technology transfer professional remarked that 'the faculty doesn't understand 
this issue at all, and it's hard to explain it to them. We have no real horror stories to back up our 
concern. But universities have endowments [that could be depleted by tort judgments], and some 
of these materials are actually dangerous'. 
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At the same time, however, technology transfer professionals must rely on the 
scientists to alert them to potential problems and to monitor and comply with 
any obligations imposed by the agreements.56 
This divergence of perspectives within universities is not lost on those who 
negotiate the terms of research tool agreements on behalf of private compan-
ies. Company representatives see (and encourage university scientists to see) 
university technology transfer professionals as the true obstacles to the expe-
ditious transfer of research tools, stalling research in the hope of preserving 
speculative future intellectual property. In the words of a scientific liaison to 
a biotechnology company, 'the function of the technology transfer office 
should be to serve the faculty, not to make money, yet they refer to faculty as 
children'. 
But the interests of the faculty are not necessarily the same as the interests 
of the university. Although faculty members are employees of universities and 
are typically bound by contract to assign intellectual property rights in their 
discoveries to their employers, the agency relationship between faculty mem-
bers and universities is attenuated by traditions of academic freedom that 
protect faculty from institutional control of their academic work. Faculty 
members enjoy considerable freedom to select and pursue their own research 
agendas-typically with external funding-and to publish their results with-
out prior institutional approval. Whereas researchers in the private sector are 
often bound by confidentiality agreements or non-competition covenants 
that prohibit their use of information gained from working for a particular 
employer when they move to a new job, faculty members who move from one 
academic institution to another typically take their research (and grants) with 
them. Moves from one academic institution to another rarely lead to litiga-
tion over intellectual property rights between universities and former faculty 
members, although as a purely legal matter universities are generally entitled 
to claim ownership of the patentable inventions developed by their employ-
ees using university facilities. 57 Within the academy, faculty members who 
resist institutional constraints on their research feel that they are upholding a 
sacrosanct tradition rather than violating a fiduciary duty. 
This strong tradition of faculty autonomy from institutional control of the 
conduct of research makes universities wary of incurring institutional obliga-
tions that rely on faculty members for compliance.58 Yet providers of 
56 A technology transfer professional for a major research university noted: 'It's not really 
possible for a bureaucrat to recognize the problems looking at a text. You have to rely on the sci-
entists, whose skill and integrity in these matters vary'. 
57 Litigation is more likely when a departing faculty member brings research to a private firm. 
See eg, University Patents v. Kligman, 762 F.Supp. 1212 (E.D. Pa. 1991). 
58 Some common provisions in research tool agreements, such as prepublication review pro-
visions, prohibitions against transfer to another laboratory or institution, and obligations to dis-
close data to the provider, impose obligations that call for compliance on the part of the faculty 
scientist. Others, including payment obligations, reach-through royalties, automatic licenses, 
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research tools to academic scientists typically seek to bind the universities, 
and not just the faculty members, to the terms of their agreements. Academic 
scientists thus need the concurrence of university technology transfer profes-
sionals to receive incoming research tools. But if the scientists later violate the 
terms of the agreements, whether through inadvertence or indifference, the 
institution will be exposed to liability. 
Faculty autonomy also limits the power of university technology transfer 
professionals over the terms of exchange for outgoing research tools. 
Although in theory the university owns these tools, as a practical matter fac-
ulty members have the power to bypass the technology transfer office when 
they send out their materials for use in other institutions and universities are 
unlikely to sue them for doing so. 
Private companies typically have considerably more control than universi-
ties over the activities of their employed scientists. Nonetheless, some com-
ments from lawyers and business people in these firms suggested there might 
be similar divergences of interest among the various agents involved in the 
transfer of research tools in the private sector. The benefits of exchanging 
research tools with academic counterparts-collegiality, access to data, 
opportunities for prestigious collaborations and publications, and scientific 
credibility-are often more palpable to commercial scientists than they are to 
the lawyers and business people whose approval is necessary to conclude the 
exchange. Many company representatives reported that their scientists 
exchange materials with academic counterparts informally without getting 
the approval of the firm or its lawyers. 59 This practice exceeds the authority 
that firms typically give scientists to send out materials under the company's 
form agreement, but not to vary the terms of the agreement without approval. 
The practical (if not legal) ability of scientists to bypass the business and 
legal agents that represent their employers when they exchange research tools 
appears to be creating a two-tiered market. In the 'free exchange' tier, scien-
tists deal with one another directly and impose minimal obligations and 
paperwork, while in the 'proprietary' tier, lawyers and technology transfer 
professionals haggle over terms of exchange with resulting delays in research. 
The existence of a free exchange tier relieves some of the pressure on the 
exchange system overall by avoiding the transaction costs of proprietary 
options to acquire licenses, and indemnity provisions, call for compliance on the part of the uni-
versity. Either way, the institution is likely to face liability for noncompliance. Even if the uni-
versity has a formal right to seek indemnity from the faculty member, this right is unlikely to be 
exercised and may be of little value. 
59 The director of scientific affairs at a biotechnology company reported: 'The scientists here 
will often send research reagents without my knowledge ... We have an R&D driven staff that 
generally think it's a waste of resources to use agreements for all the research reagents ... It's a 
method of gaining good will, developing a rapport with labs that we may later have more sub-
stantial relationships with. The legal department frowns upon it. Scientists are under specific 
instructions not to send out anything proprietary without an MT A'. 
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exchange in some cases. But these two tiers are not entirely separate. Because 
the terms of exchange in the proprietary tier typically restrict subsequent free 
exchange of materials, some of the free exchange transactions may eventually 
give rise to liability for breach of contract. As a result, lawyers and techno-
logy transfer professionals become ever more wary of free exchange and more 
assiduous about restricting its domain, while scientists become ever more 
frustrated with proprietary exchange and more motivated to bypass its 
constraints. 
D. Difficulties in valuation 
Virtually everyone who provided information to the Working Group cited dif-
ficulties in measuring the value of access to a research tool as an obstacle to 
negotiating terms of exchange. Pharmaceutical firms, biotechnology firms, and 
universities framed the problem somewhat differently, but research tool users 
within each sector share the perception that tool-providers in the other sectors 
are asking for too much and overvaluing the contribution of particular tools 
relative to other inputs that contribute to future valuable discoveries. 
Representatives of pharmaceutical firms argue that a fair measure of the 
value of both incoming and outgoing research tools is the cost of creating the 
tools. 60 They are often willing to pay such a sum for incoming tools up-front, 
but they are loath to promise to pay royalties on future product sales for 
access to research tools, believing that in most cases such payment terms 
would grossly overvalue the contribution of a research tool relative to other 
investments in the course of drug development.61 They complain that univer-
sities and biotechnology firms have unrealistic expectations of making money 
from research tools, given that these institutions do not share in the full costs 
and risks of the complex process of drug discovery. 62 
60 One representative of a major pharmaceutical firm said that his firm has a philosophy of 
'making research tools available at reasonable cost' defined as 'what it would cost in time and 
money to reproduce [the tool)'. He contrasted this perspective with the 'gold rush mentality' of 
some universities that have 'inappropriate expectations' that they are 'going to be able to make 
money for the university' and biotechnology firms that are 'striving to jack up stock prices' with 
'business plans that are strictly financial, not drug discovery'. 
61 A research director for a major pharmaceutical firm explained: 'Reach-through royalties 
are making everyone crazy ... If someone makes a discovery of substantial value that was the 
core critical issue that gave us a competitive advantage, that has value, and if we succeed, the per-
son who gave us that should succeed. But [only] for really critical discoveries ... The way to judge 
a critical contribution is for the company to say I can't do this without it'. A high-ranking exec-
utive in another major pharmaceutical firm sees the overvaluation problem as compounded by 
the issuance of multiple, overlapping patents on research tools: 'You have a series of different 
academic labs working with a receptor and you may get lots of different claims coming from dif-
ferent labs. Royalty-mounting can frustrate the economic incentive to develop'. 
62 In the words of a high-ranking representative of a major pharmaceutical firm: 'Individuals 
in tech transfer offices in universities have had the fire lit under them to go forth and capture this 
presumed pot of gold. It leads them to take an unrealistic posture in asking for reach-through 
rights'. 
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Consistent with the position that they take for incoming research tools, 
when pharmaceutical firms set the terms of access to outgoing research tools 
and materials for other institutions, they do not seek promises of future roy-
alties or even large up-front payments. They are typically more concerned 
about protecting themselves against future obligations than about collecting 
cash payments or garnering a share of future profits. 63 Their principal wor-
ries are (1) that use of the tool will compete with the firm's own work and 
enhance the position of a competitor who either collaborates with the user or 
takes a license to the user's discoveries;64 (2) that the research will yield pub-
lications that undermine the firm's patent position65 or generate patents that 
constrain the firm's freedom to develop its own products fully; 66 and (3) if the 
research tool is a pharmaceutical product in development, that the user's data 
will suggest possible harmful side-effects that create regulatory problems and 
add to the costs of clinical trials.67 They therefore ask that the tool not be dis-
tributed beyond the laboratory and/or scientist to whom the firm is providing 
it, that the scientist explain what will be done with the material and report 
research results, and in some cases that the firm receive an automatic license 
to use any improvements for internal research purposes and/or an option to 
obtain an exclusive license to future discoveries. To pharmaceutical firms, 
these provisions are defensive measures that protect them from losing com-
petitive ground when they make their materials available free of charge to 
academic scientists. 
Universities that are confronted with such provisions for access to incom-
ing research tools take a different view. From their perspective, agreements 
63 A representative of a major pharmaceutical firm explained that 'we don't charge academic 
labs anything, but we do charge companies nominal payments. We ask [universities] for a nonex-
clusive license for internal research to improvements that they make, disclosure of improvements, 
and maybe prepublication review'. 
64 A research director for a major pharmaceutical firm said that when the firm makes research 
tools available to academic researchers, there is a 'major risk ... of transfer to another company 
... Scientists with the most strident voices in the debate [about access to research tools] are often 
those that have conflicts of interest'. 
65 In the words of a research director for a major pharmaceutical firm: 'What matters most is 
being informed that something has been found using this tool, so we don't just find out about it 
in a paper. We want the opportunity to file for patents or seek a license'. 
66 This concern is particularly significant in the case of research that might uncover new uses 
for pharmaceutical compounds. A representative of a major pharmaceutical firm explained: 
'with a compound, we'd probably be very sensitive if we saw an experiment description that 
might lead to a new use. We might use a research collaboration and licensing agreement rather 
than a simple material transfer agreement. If someone is going out to find a new indication, and 
we think that we've given the essential material, it makes no sense to exclude us'. 
67 A lawyer for a major pharmaceutical firm said that 'the last thing you want to do is become 
obligated to do further toxicology studies'. Another pharmaceutical representative downplayed 
this concern, saying that although 'inadvertent activity that gives rise to concern about the com-
pound can be very difficult to deal with, you don't want to suppress legitimate information about 
adverse effects'. He rated this concern as 'minor on the scale of things', although conceding that 
this problem is minimized because firms rarely release products in development for use as 
research tools. 
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that condition access to a research tool on license rights to future discoveries 
overvalue the research tool relative to potential future discoveries. If they 
agree to give automatic, nonexclusive licenses to providers of research tools, 
they will not be able to grant more lucrative exclusive licenses to their future 
discoveries to anyone else, regardless of the value of the discoveries. As for 
granting options to enter into an exclusive license, this is the compensation 
that universities give for full research sponsorship, not for the mere contribu-
tion of a research tool. They see promises to grant license rights to future dis-
coveries in exchange for research tools as forced bargain sales that undervalue 
their future intellectual property.68 
On the other hand, many private firms reported to the Working Group that 
universities frequently seek reach-through royalties on future products as 
payment for the outgoing research tools that they provide to the private sec-
tor. Although reach-through royalties on future product sales are not the 
same as grantbacks of license rights to future discoveries, both mechanisms 
compromise the value of future discoveries made by the user of a research 
tool. Universities may be more successful in imposing reach-through royalties 
on biotechnology firms than on pharmaceutical firms. 69 
Biotechnology firms and pharmaceutical firms tend to agree with each 
other that universities have unrealistic expectations as providers of research 
tools. They have different concerns, however, when it comes to setting the 
terms of access to their own outgoing research tools. In contrast to the defen-
sive focus of pharmaceutical firms in licensing their outgoing research tools, 
biotechnology firms often see their own proprietary research tools as central 
to their evolving business strategies and as a critical source of value for the 
firm. Both pharmaceutical firms and universities complain that biotechnol-
ogy firms overvalue their research tools and have unrealistic expectations 
about what they can demand for them. Pharmaceutical firms explain the ten-
dency to overvalue research tools on the part of both biotechnology firms and 
universities as stemming from ignorance of the costs and risks involved in the 
drug discovery process. One representative of a pharmaceutical firm 
explained that biotechnology firms typically focus on a small number of 
68 A representative of a biotechnology firm suggested that concern on the part of universities 
about undermining the marketability of their future discoveries reflects an inflated sense of the 
commercial value of their own discoveries: 'Universities think they have something commercially 
viable when they don't. If it were viable we'd be in line for an exclusive license. So I don't think 
our nonexclusive licenses are really preventing them from selling anything they could otherwise 
sell'. 
69 In the words of a representative of a major pharmaceutical firm: 'biotechs like reach-
throughs, and pharmas hate them'. This may be because biotechnology firms themselves seek 
reach-through royalties as compensation for providing research tools. One high-ranking officer 
of a biotechnology firm speculated that another reason may be that biotechnology firms expect 
to be able to offload reach-through royalty obligations onto a pharmaceutical firm that ulti-
mately develops the product, although the biotechnology firm might thereby reduce its own roy-
alties on the product. 
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research strategies and overvalue their chances for success. Pharmaceutical 
firms, on the other hand, understand that 'in this business, you've got to get 
a lot of shots on goal, because most of them never make it'. 
Conflict over the value of research tools seems to be particularly aggra-
vated for exchanges between biotechnology firms and universities, perhaps 
because both sides of the exchange are typically cash-poor. When biotech-
nology firms provide outgoing research tools to universities, they often seek 
not merely to protect themselves from competitive harm, but to profit from 
future discoveries made through use of their tools. In the words of a lawyer 
for a biotechnology firm: 'most small companies resolve it this way: If we're 
going to give a research tool to a company, we'll charge money. Ifwe give it 
to a university, we need to get some other kind of value out of them' in the 
form of license rights to future discoveries. A lawyer for another biotechnol-
ogy firm elaborates that since universities can't afford to pay full price for 
access to research tools, 'we ask them to pay with the currency they have, 
which is intellectual property'. 70 
In contrast to some pharmaceutical firms that express a commitment to 
make research tools available in order to advance science, many representa-
tives of biotechnology firms expressed a need to justify their dissemination of 
research tools to shareholders and boards of directors in terms of potential 
profits for the company. One representative of a biotechnology firm 
explained that 'the promise of a possible exclusive license is how we justify 
throwing money away by giving out free material'.71 
Some biotechnology firms seek grantbacks of licenses to any discoveries 
made through use of their research tools, without restrictions to particular 
fields of use contemplated by the firm. A senior patent counsel for a biotech-
nology firm explained that such broad rights are necessary because of the dif-
ficulty of drafting agreements that precisely allocate rights in unpredictable 
research results: 'Whatever they come up with is likely to either be useful with 
or compete with our molecule. It's hard to draft an option that only catches 
the things we will want an exclusive license to, so we draft it broadly'. A 
lawyer for another firm offered a somewhat different, and perhaps more can-
did, explanation: 'My biggest fear is that an academic institution is going to 
discover something valuable with my technology, whether I planned on it or 
it's totally unplanned. I want to have some opportunity to get access to the 
technology, to use or exploit it, or to work with the institution to jointly con-
trol disposition. It's human nature to want that, even though I'm no worse 
off. It's more emotional than rational'. 
70 This firm asks universities for an option to take an exclusive license to future discoveries at 
a predetermined royalty rate, a provision that is very unpopular with universities. He explains 
that 'no one knows how to value this stuff, and everyone's afraid of getting burned. They're wor-
ried that they're going to license out a blockbuster cheap'. 
71 A lawyer for another biotechnology firm put the point even more bluntly: 'A business is in 
business to make money for somebody. You can't have people giving things out for free'. 
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One senses in the remarks from representatives of all sectors that emotions 
are playing a large role in negotiations over the transfer of research tools. 
Perhaps the inherent difficulty of assessing values for research tools relative 
to the values of potential future discoveries makes it difficult to identify dis-
passionate points of reference that everyone can agree upon. Research 
involves investigation of the unknown; its outcome is inherently uncertain. 
Information that would help estimate the likely value of research using a tool 
is divided between the owner of the tool (who has typically worked with the 
tool and may already be pursuing what it considers the most promising uses) 
and the would-be user (who may have complementary expertise that brings 
into view a research plan that might or might not have occurred to the owner). 
If owners and users perceive each other as rivals, they may be reluctant to 
share information regarding their valuations and skeptical of each other's 
purported assessments.72 For research that is remote from end product devel-
opment, it may be some time before the commercial value of resulting dis-
coveries becomes apparent; and even when research yields an outcome of 
manifest value, it may be difficult to agree on a formula for assessing how that 
value should be apportioned between prior and subsequent innovators. 
The profitable endpoint of biomedical research is the development of a suc-
cessful pharmaceutical product. A strong patent position on such a product 
can be quite lucrative, although such products are outliers in a distribution 
that includes many costly failures. 73 But many of the institutions involved in 
the complex enterprise of biomedical research have no expectation of ever 
bringing a pharmaceutical product to market themselves. Universities and 
many biotechnology firms specialize in earlier stage discoveries that provide 
a platform for the discovery of new pharmaceutical products. The challenge 
for these institutions is to leverage their proprietary rights in premarket dis-
coveries into a place at the feeding trough of a new pharmaceutical product. 
Given the vicissitudes of drug discovery, tools used in research that may or 
may not yield lucrative products typically have a low expected value to the 
user. The farther upstream from product development the research lies, the 
less likely the user is to be willing or able to pay a large up-front fee for use of 
72 Recognizing that informational asymmetries exist, owners and users of research tools may 
draw inferences from each other's bargaining behavior that lead them away from agreement 
rather than towards it. For example, an owner of a research tool may figure that if a prospective 
user wants to use it badly enough to invest resources in negotiating the terms of exchange, it must 
be valuable, and the owner will therefore hold out for favorable terms. The user's resistance to 
particular terms in the agreement may signal to the owner that those provisions are particularly 
valuable to retain, eg, if the user is reluctant to promise the owner a license to future discoveries, 
the user must believe it is on the verge of making an important discovery. 
73 As F.M. Scherer and his co-authors have documented, the value of innovations exhibits a 
highly skew distribution. See Scherer, Chapter I above; F.M. Scherer et al., Uncertainty and the 
Size Distribution of Rewards from Technological Innovation (March 1998) (unpublished manu-
script); Dietmar Harhoff et al., Exploring the Tail of Patented Invention Value Distributions 
(1998) (unpublished manuscript). 
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the tool. Academic researchers may lack the resources to pay more than a 
trivial sum, and private firms may consider the remote prospect of future 
commercial gain insufficient to justify a large payment. Contingent payment 
mechanisms such as reach-through royalties or grantbacks oflicense rights in 
future discoveries rest on even less informed speculations about how large a 
share of the value of potential future discoveries is properly attributed to the 
use of a research tool. To the extent that these mechanisms diminish the value 
of future discoveries to their owners, they also undermine incentives to pur-
sue commercial development. Owners ofresearch tools may believe that their 
materials will be of considerable value in the discovery of commercial prod-
ucts, and manifestations of interest from researchers at other institutions are 
likely to confirm that belief. The result may be protracted negotiations over 
value that lead the parties away from, rather than towards, agreement. 
III. Conclusion 
The exchange of research tools within the biomedical research community 
often involves vexing and protracted negotiations over terms and value. 
Although owners and users of research tools usually manage to work out 
their differences when the transactions matter greatly to both sides, difficult 
negotiations often cause delays in research and sometimes lead to the aban-
donment of research plans. Transaction costs have remained persistently high 
in this setting as the heterogeneous institutions involved in the exchange of 
research tools have been unable to agree upon standardized contract lan-
guage, or even to agree upon a universe of materials, information and tech-
niques that are properly termed 'research tools'. The result has been 
burdensome and frustrating case by case negotiations over exchanges that in 
an earlier era might have occurred between scientists without formal legal 
agreements. 
Is this a picture of market failure, or is it simply a market? Surely most mar-
kets are characterized by positive transaction costs that render some low 
value transactions prohibitively expensive. Why should we care if the low 
value end of this particular market gets bogged down in negotiations, or even 
fails? 
One reason why we might care about this particular market is that, 
although the value of any particular transfer of a research tool may appear 
small ex ante, some such transfers, if they go forward, may prove to have been 
highly valuable ex post. (Indeed, it is this remote possibility, and the impossi-
bility of distinguishing high value from low value exchanges ex ante, that 
motivates the parties to bargain hard over the terms of each exchange.) 
However skew the distribution, the aggregate social value of widespread 
dissemination of biomedical research tools is likely to be quite large. When 
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biomedical research is repeatedly stalled pending negotiations over the terms 
of MT As, the social cost of foregone or delayed innovations, measured in 
lives and health, could prove to be substantial. 
This close-up picture of what goes on in the market for biomedical research 
tools serves as a reminder that transaction costs for transfers of intellectual 
property are indeed positive and not negligible. Bargaining over intellectual 
property rights in the context of cumulative innovation is problematic. 
Nonetheless, the limited context investigated by the Working Group cautions 
against broad generalizations about what might be happening outside that 
context. Do similar problems arise in other settings, including other fields of 
technology? The foregoing discussion suggests some features of a market for 
intellectual property that may impede agreement upon terms of exchange, 
including high transaction costs relative to likely gains from exchange, par-
ticipation of heterogeneous institutions with different missions, complex and 
conflicting agendas of different agents within these institutions, and difficul-
ties in evaluating present and future intellectual property rights when profits 
are speculative and remote. 
In some settings institutions have emerged to bring down transaction costs 
associated with a proliferation of intellectual property rights, but in some set-
tings they have not. It is important to weigh these costs, and the foregone 
value of the exchanges that they prevent, in assessing the wisdom of creating 
new intellectual property rights, rather than simply assuming that bargains 
between owners and users will bring about efficient reallocation of rights. 
